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ABSTRACT
Thispaper presents evidence about the coats of corporate
capital in Japan and the US, for a sample of large companies, and
evaluates a variety of hypotheses about why the cost might be lower
in Japan.
We find that the before-tax return to capital in Japanappears
slightly lower than in the U.S. when corrected book measures of
earnings are used, but that this result would be reversed if market
returns to Japanese equity were used in place of correctedearnings to measure the cost of equity.
Towhateverextent the cost of capital may actually be lower in
Japan, we show that. this is unlikely to be due either to a lower
overall corporate tax burden or the particular tax advantages of
corporate borrowing.
AlanAuerbach tpartxrent of Econiics parnt of Enics
t.üversity of Pennsylvania University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia,PA19104 Philadelphia, PA 191041. Introduction
Very high real interest rates and a trade deficit that exceeded
100 billion dollars in 1984 have caused muchconcern over the
ability of American firms to keep up with their foreign competitors.
A greet deal of the discussion of this topic has focused
particularly on Japan, since Japan alone accounted for a large
fraction of this enormous overall 1984 trade deficitthrough its
success in exporting to the U.S. goods once supplied primarily by
domestic producers.
Attempts to explain this favorable Japanese performance have
taken many forms. Some have suggested that Japanmay impose
barriers to American firms' attempts at establishingmarkets, either
through explicit policy actions, or collusion among government,
producers, distributors end banks, or a lack of faith in thequality
of U.S.-produced goods. Others have argued that the U.S. trade
imbalance is the inevitable result of our elevated realexchange
rate, which makes American goods more expensive than those of our
trading partners. This high real exchange rate is, in turn,
attributed by many to the unprecedented peacetime fiscal deficits
currently being experienced.
While each of these potential explanations may be important,
there is a third on which we focus in this paper: the cost of
capital. Some have suggested1 that Japanese firms en-ioy a lower
before-tax cost of raising funds in capital markets thatallows theni2
--togain a competitive advantage in the capital intensiveindustries
where they have made particularly striking progress during the past
two decades, such as autos and steel.
This explanation is not entirely independent of those already
mentioned. The mechanism through which the high real exchangerate
is supposed to have occurred is the strong foreign demandfor U.S.
assets brought on by high domestic real interest rates; oneof the
forms of Japanese industrial policy is said to work throughthe
direction of funds to promising enterprises. There are, however,
many additional factors that could contributeto a cost of capital
differential between the two countries. The purpose of this paper
is to state clearly what these might be, and adduceevidence that
will shed light on their validity. Something more than claimsof
unfair competition should be required as evidence before such a
complex proposition as a major difference in capital costis
accepted as a "fact." Hence. we begin with some basiccalculations
for our sample of Japanese and American firms to see whetherthere
is convincing prima facie evidence of a lower cost of capitalin
Japan.
Our approach involves the use of market arid financial statement
data for a representative but non-random sample of 19 Americanand
21 Japanese firma to answer first the question of whether the cost
of capital really has been systematically lower in Japan.
In the case of an affirmative answer, our next step is to test
predictions based on different theories of why these costsdiffer.
Because we consider only a small sample of firms, our results must
be regarded with caution in extrapolating to economy—wide
conclusions. Nevertheless, we consider this to be an important.3
first step in determining where further research shouldbe directed.
2. Is the Cost of Capital Lower in Japan?
For several reasons, one cannot simply look at the realinterest
rates in the U.S. end Japan to determine what the cost ofcapital is
in each country. Because of differences in taxtreatment, financial
policies and legal end financial institutions, to citeJust some of
the complicating factors, there is no simpleway to translate an
interest rate into a relevant measure of the cost ofcapital without
additional information.
One alternative approach is to look at total before-taxreturns
to debt and equity over a period of severalyears. A still simpler
approach is to look exclusively at equity alone by examining
earnings—price ratios. In each case, one assumes that, over a
sufficiently long period of time, these ex post measures reflect
their ex ante expectations. There are severalproblems with such
measures of which we are well aware, but they are frequently used
and cited and easy to calculate, making theirpresentation a good
place to begin our empirical analysis.
Listed in the first column of Tables la end lj are thenames of
the American and Japanese firms used in our study. The second
column of each table lists total market value of debtplus equity at
the end of the company's 1981 fiscal year.
Our selection criteria included availability of data, firm
size, and coverage of important industries. For eachcountry, we
have one representative of the airline industry (DeltaAirlines arid























































































1981 Market ValuePension ReserveE/F (66-81) ElF (66-81) R/K (6681) R/K (66-81>
(Billion Yen> (Without Ad) (With Ad). for Before Tax Befor, lax
for P.nsion Pension Reserve) (Without Ad). (With Ad). for
Reserve> for Pension Pension R.s.rve)
R.s.rv.)
Full
Fuji 466.1 46.3 14.4 16.7 11.8 14.7
Fujitsu 744.1 13.9 8.0 8.5 7.4 7.8
Keo 179.1 2.4 15.0 15.4 10.0 10.6
Ke.asaki 1,585.2 46.6 12.9 14.3 9.2 9.8
Konishiro 190.1 15.6 9.3 12.6 7.8 10.0
Lion 117.3 6.5 27.2 28.9 15.7 17.4
MitsubIshi 831.8 13.8 9.3 10.0 7.1 7.4
Mitsukoshl 234.4 19.9 10,4 11.2 10.0 11.4
Nationsi 1.999.i 67.3 15.4 16.3 14.7 16.6
NEC 1,093.4 20.4 6.8 7.4 6.6 7.0
NipponAir 555.2 12.8 2.6 3.2 4.5 4.8
Nippon Steel 2,969.4 154.7 14.2 15.7 9.5 10.3
Nisssn 1,638.4 69.5 17.0 17,6 11.4 12.0
Oki 237.6 7.5 6.3 7.4 6.6 7.3
Shlonogi 193.2 12.4 21.1 23.2 15.4 18.2
Sony 1,113.6 19.1 8.0 8.4 7.6 8.0
Susito*o 641.0 15.8 6.8 7.5 7.0 7.5
Tsisho 279.9 2.5 14.3 24.5 13.5 13.8
tsksshlsays 139.1 6.9 13.1 14.2 9.7 10.5
Takeda 662.0 55.5 16.6 19.1 1l6 14.7
Toshiba 1,238.8 25.0 10.4 11.0 7.9 8.26
and Takashimaya) .Insteel, cameras end film, and consumer
products, we have one American and two Japanesefirms (U.S. Steel.
Kawasaki Steel and Nippon Steel; Kodak, Fuji Film and Konishiroku
Photo; Procter and Gamble. Kao Soap and Lion). Inthe automobile
industry, we include all three major companies (GM,Ford and
Chrysler) because of differences in their recent experience.We
include only Nissan from Japan because the largest producer, Toyota,
underwent a malor merger during the sample period that makes its
date difficult to use.
In the consumer and business electronics area, we include
General Electric for the U.S. and Sony, National (Matsushita)and
Toshiba for Japan. Companies in the computer and semiconductor
industries include IBM, Control Data, Digital Equipmentand National
Semiconductor for the U.S. and Fujitsu, NEC and Oki Electric for
Japan. There is a substantial amount of overlap inthe areas of
business of these two groups of companies.
Drug and pharmaceutical companies included in the samplefrom
the U.S. are Merck and Pfizer, while Shinogi. and Teisho areincluded
for Japan. In the related chemical industry, we have DowChemical
and Mitsubishi Chemical, Sumitomo Chemical and Takeda Chemical.
Finally, although we do not have any suitable Japanese counterparts.
we include AT&T and Exxon in the sample of U.S. firmsbecause of
their importance.
Data for the Japanese companies come primarily from the NEEDS -
NikkeiFinancial Tape. This data file is based on public balance
sheet and income statement information provided by the companies on
an annual basis. Our version of the file extends from1964 to 1983,
with individual companies having data either for 1964-82 or 1965-837
depending on their fiscal years.
For the United States, we use Standard and Poor'sCompustat
file which has comparable date for the Americancompanies from 1963
to 1982. with most companies having data from 1963-81or 1963-82,
depending on their fiscal years. The two exceptions are DEC end
National Semiconductor, for which data is not available before 1966.
In Tables la aridlj,we also report average rates of return for
each company for the period 1966-81, including the before-tax
earnings—price ratio end the total before-tax return to debt plus
equity. For purposes of computing the latter statistic, we add
interest payments to earnings to obtain the total return to capital.
Debt is defined for each country to be the sum of long-term debt and
short-term financial liabilities. Thus, although we include
financial trade credit, we exclude the general category of accounts
payable from debt. One exception to this rule is "accrued
employees' severance indemnities", which we do exclude from debt.
In the third column of Table lj, we report the size of thisaccount,
which we shall hereafter refer to as "Pension Reserves. Columns 4
and 5 arid6 and7 in Table lj show how much difference the exclusion
of this item makes in the earnings price ratio and the total return
on capital. In the remainder of this paper, we exclude this account
from debt unless otherwise noted.
From these tables there is only mixed evidence in support of
the proposition that Japanese firms enjoy a lower cost ofcapital.
If one concentrates on total returns to capital, there aresome
industries in which Japanese firms have a substantially lower return
(e.g., airlines, steel, and, excluding Chrysler, which should be
considered a special case because of its near bankruptcy, autos)8
but others in which the reverse is true (e.g., pharmaceuticals)arid
many in which there is no clear pattern. Forthe U.S. sample of
companies, the median average return to capital for the period was
10.3 percent, while it was 9.5 percent for the Japanese sample,and
10.3 percent with the correction made for pension reserve
accounting. Given the size of our sample, this does notconstitute
very strong evidence that returns are systematicallylower in Japan.
3. Corrected Measures of the Return to Capital
There are many problems with the use of book value earnings
data to measure the cost of capital. Perhaps the most serious is
the distortion caused by inflation to book value measures of
income.3 Because of the general lack of inflation adjusted
financial data, we must make such corrections ourselves to the book
value information. This is especially important for a cross—country
comparison, since historical patterns of the rate of inflationin
the two countries are substantially different and accounting
practices, debt equity ratios and tax structures, threefactors that
affect the relationship among inflation, profitability and
accounting biases, are also markedly different. The most critical
distortions to remove are the misstatement of depreciation and the
cost of goods sold and the absence of any accounting for real gains
and losses on nominal liabilities arid assets. Given the nature of
the data for each country, certain assumptions must be made in order
to carryout each of thesethree corrections. These are described
aswe discusshow the corrections were performed.9
3a. Depreciation
We assume that depreciation would beproperly measured in the
absence of inflation. This reflects our fervent beliefless than
our inability to assume otherwise. To restate depreciation based
on original cost in current dollar terms requires informationon the
vintage structure of each year's overall depreciation, since the
price factor by which book depreciation must be inflateddepends on
the age of the asset to which the depreciationapplies. We produce
4 anestimated vintage structure in the following manner.We first
assume that the net (of depreciation) capital stock listed in the
first year requires no correction. This is reasonable,given, the
low rates of inflation in both countries in theyears immediately
preceding the mid-1960s. We then assume that each corporation's
depreciable assets are written off using the declining balance
method at a single rate. Finally, using the perpetualinventory
method, we solve for the value of this rate that would yield the
listed book value for net capital in the lastyear for which data
are available. That is, the declining balance rate, c, is defined
implicitly by:
(1) =K*(l T (l)T1 +. . . T o 1 T
where is the book value of net capital at the end of year t and
is the book value of gross investment during year t.Since all
these values of I and K are positive, the solution foris unique.
There are additional problems presented by each country's data set.
For Japan, there are no separate figures listed forgross10
investment. We impute an investment series from the sumof
depreciation and the first difference of thenet capital stock. For
the U.S., there are no separate figures for landarid depreciable
assets, only the sum. This should lower theestimate of the average
depreciation rate, since land is nondepreciable.In addition, the
-treatmentof assets acquired through merger rather than direct
investment is inconsistent; they appear in the capital stock,but
are not in reportedinvestment.5We performed calculations for the
U.S. using both reported investment and, as was necessaryfor Japan.
imputed investment. Estimated values ofwere generally lower end
more reasonable (given previous estimates)when imputed investment
was used. Because of this, as well as tobe as consistent as
possible in our methodologies for the two countries, wepresent
calculations based on imputed rather than actual investment.This
generally leads to a somewhat higher estimateof the overall return
to capital (in the neighborhood of 1 percentage pointbefore-tax)
than when actual investment is used. The depreciationrates are
interesting in their own right, and are given in thesecond column
of Tables 2a and 2j. The variation across companies is consistent
with general expectations. Firms in the computer industry, for
example. evidence very rapid rates compared to retailers,whose
capital is largely in the form of buildings.
It is difficult to know how much the generally more rapid
depreciation rates for Japan are due to the omission of landfrom
the calculations.6To the extent that this does not completely
explain the difference, one might hypothesize that someof the gap
in rates of return in the two countries lies in different procedures
for measuring depreciation.11
Table2a
Depreciation Rates and Average Adjusted Ratesof Return-U.S. Name Deprec- DJD+E E/P (66-81) R/K (66-81) ciatjon (66-81)Before AfterBefore After
Tax Tax Tax Tax
AT&T 6.7 44.3 12.9 7.5
Chrysler 14.0 51.4 -9.6
9.3 4.5
CDC 35.1 38.5 10.9
3.2 -2.5
Delta 13.2 22.2 14.7
8.9 7.2 4.0
DEC 18.4 4.3 4.9
11.6 6.1
Dow 14.1 30.8 15.1
4.6 2.2
Kodak 12.8 1.1 9.3
10.7 5.9
Exxon 9.0 18.2 30,9
4.6 9.7 4.8
Ford 20.8 29.3 15.5
12.0 25.2 9.3
GE 15.9 13.3 13.0
15.5 6.9
GM 32.2 9.4 17.3
8.0 11.6 6.7
IB1 21.3 2.8 8.6
8.8 16.4 7.9




Merck 9.7 3.0 6.8
18.1 9.1
Nat. Semi. 31.1 9.9 8.3
6.5 3.6




Sears 8.7 31.1 9.7
9.4 4.7




Before After ciation(66-81) BeforeAfter
Tax Rate Tax Tax Tax
Fuii 24.4 28.2 15.8 9.2 12.0
5.2
6.1
2.2 Fuitsu 34.1 38.3 8.8 5.5
9.1 4.2 Kao 28.0 40.0 17.710.4
3.5 Kawasaki 13.2 73.0 22.016.8
6.5 2.5 Konishiroku22.1 50.3 12.6 7.6
13.5 5.8 Lion 20.4 52.6 28.4 15.1
Mitsubishi 18.3 76.2 17.0 14.1 4.0
10.8 5.9 Mitsukoshi 15.9 9.8 11.4 6.6
15.5 8.4 National 44.0 11.0 16.0 8.8
1.5 NEC 34.6 52.4 8.6 6.1
5.1 3.3 Nippon Air 19.8 48.2 12.5 11.3
7.5 3.7 Nippon Steel15.0 72.5 23.1
11.8 8.9 4.3 Nissan 30.3 48.5 18.4
3.8 1.1 Oki 30.2 54.8 7.2 4.6
6.2 Shionogi 20.2 30.5 20.0 10.2
6.3 2.9 Sony 30.1 15.0 7.5 3.9
4.6 2.1 Sumitomo 19.8 67.3 12,5
11.0 5.4 Taisho 18.1 7.7 12.1 6.1
4.5 Takashimaya13.5 54.2 18.5 12.7
10.2 3.8 Takeda 24.0 31.5 15.6
3.6 0.6 Toshiba 31.8 65.2 10.0 6.313
With these estimated rates of economic depreciation,we went
beck and estimated current dollar capital stocksusing the
expression:
(2) =P*}(18)TJ+1 (18)T1/p .. . I/P T To 01 1 T T
where Pt is a price index (the gross national expendituredeflator
for Japan and the gross domestic business product deflator forthe
U.S.). Depreciation in year t is estimated to be8*Kctl, and the
difference between this measure arid the listed bookmeasure is
subtracted from earnings.
3b. Inventories
Companies can use any one of several accounting methods for all
or part of their inventories and can shift from one method or
combination of methods to another. Japanese firms list all methods
used in each year for each stage of fabrication (materials, workin
process, and finished goods). U.S. firms also include information
on which method is the most common, but information is not broken
down by stages of fabrication.
In the presence of inflation, only a system of indexed FIFO
(First-In, First-Out) inventory accounting would correctly state the
cost of goods sold in current dollars. Though this system is not in
use, the same outcome occurs under the LIFO (Last-In, First-Out)
method in the absence of relative price changes or decumuition of
inventories. All other major methods syatemetically understate the
cost of goods sold in the presence of inflation. Hence, this14
correction will reduce measured returns to capital, potentially more
for the U.S., which has experienced more inflation than Japan in the
past two decades.
Thealgorithm used to restate the cost of goods sold proceeds as
follows. First, we assume that firms use a combination of FIFO.
LIFO and Average Cost accounting in each year. Other methods listed
(such as Specific Cost) are assigned to whichever of these three
major methods they most closely resemble, in our judgement.
Based on stated methods, we estimate, for Japan. the fraction of
inventories carried under each method in each year. We then average
these fractions over the sample period to obtain for each firm a
single fraction corresponding to each of the three methods.
Finally, we divide book inventories into three categories based on
these fractions, and adjust each separately in a manner appropriate
for the accounting method.
Our approach for the U.S. differs slightly, because there was a
much more pronounced trend (toward the use of LIFO) over the sample
period. To accommodate this fact, we calculate average fractions as
for Japanese firms, but allow one break during the sample period
where the fractions may change. Thus, a firm switching from FIFO to
LIFO in 1972 will have a FIFO fraction of 1.0 through 1972 and a
LIFO fraction of 1.0 thereafter.
To perform the inventory corrections, once these separate stocks
have been estimated, we begin by assuming that all goods purchased
in a given year had a price equal to that year's price index, and
that the initial year's inventories are correctly stated. We then
use book information on the cost of goods sold and the change in
inventories to estimate a time series of the cost of goods sold in15
current dollars. The method by which thia is done is differentfor
each of the three methods. For LIEU, no change in costof goods
sold is made unless book inventories declined, in whichcase the
last previous year of accumulation not alreadyrun down in the
intervening years is determined and an appropriate price correction
made. For FlED, a one-year price adjustment isnecessary for those
goods sold in the current year attributable to initial inventory
stocks. For average coat, our correction is based or theassumption
that goods purchased in the current year are added to stocks andthe
price corresponding to the cost of goods sold is the averaqeprice
at which this pool of goods in inventory is carried.
Once a current dollar measure of the cost of goods sold has been
calculated for each of the inventory method categories, the
difference between their sum end book cost of goods sold is
subtracted from book earnings.
3c. Nominal Assets and Liablilities
This correction to earnings is simple. We tel-ce the book vaaue
of nominal liablities net of nominal assets, multiply by the
concurrent annual inflation rate, end add the resulting estimate of
the capital gain on nominal liabilities to bookearnings. Since we
are studying nonfinancial companies, this is always a positive
correction.
Nominal assets and liabilities include not only financial
assets, but also accounts payable and receivable. Themajor balance
sheet items not included are real assets: inventories, depreciable
assets, and lend.16
Japanese debt—equity ratios,one
increase estimated Japanese earnings
to capital) by a greater fraction.
inflation experience works in the
Because of generally higher
might expect this correction to
(as applied to the total return
However, Japan's more favorable
opposite direction.
We have made no attempt, at this stage of research,to correct
for deviations of the market values of long termliabilities from
their book values resulting from changes in long-terminterest
rates.
3d. Results of the Corrections
Tables 3a and 3j report the results of these three corrections
to before-tax book earnings-price ratios. Average
(1966-1981) values of these series are presented in Tables 2a and
2,. column 4. For the U.S., these corrections increaseestimated
earnings-price ratios for many firms, and decreasethem for slightly
more. This may be seen by comparing the averagesin Tables la and
2a. The direction of the effect depends on whether increasesdue to
accounting for gains on liabilities offsets decreasesthat result
from correct statement of inventory and depreciation costs.
For Japanese firms, the effect of the corections is much
clearer, increasing estimated earnings for virtually all firms.
This is probably due to the generally higher debt-equity ratios
found in Japan. Average percentages of debt in total market value
(debt plus equity) are shown for U.S. and Japanese firms in column3
of Tables 2a and 2j, respectively. The median value of this








10.44 17.85 5.95 9.86
12.91 24.09 —2.239.06
14.50 13.19 1.6214.07










































































































































































































































































































AU FujiFujitsu ao Kaaskai Konishiroku Lion?1itsubisti MitsukoshiNatona1NEC




1965 15.12 29.46 10.83
1966 42.4511.4612.7713.5419.2111.91 30.50 16.81 11.05 14.61 4.53
19679.2117.6413.3422.2419.3311.87 28.10 9.66 10.49 21.94 6.70
1968 32.3715.1214.4620.9627.550.07 33.02 20.53 11.38 16.29 11.11
196916.4816.43 6.5819.2317.32 -14.49 52.07 20.84 13.77 11.15 5.42
1970 19.7615.00 7.2716.4922.816.66 49.79 36.10 13.32 23.91 9.70
1971 19.3515.26 9.7023.5030.0815.17 42.51 23.89 13,24 16.98 11.47
19728.6613.90 7.8615.7021.629.94 31.74 16.86 9,90 14.98 8.70
197314.5718.92 8.4919.9219.2215.24 44.51 13.42 7.85 20.9310.04
197416.7228.4413.0450.0062.4938.10 53.87 31.09 13,40 24.55 22.07
1975 7.10 8.60 2.92 13.56 18.92 25.45 7.92 43.94 11,06 9.66 8.18
19767.0911.25 2.019.589.9016.50 20.36 11.15 11.16 14.65 5.55
19771.8712.76 7.365.6211.7813.86 17.73 5.95 12,02 16.40 7.48
19780.8713.98 10.37 9.4712.67 13.64 8.26 11.10 13.93 6.24
19792.3613.67 16.26 10.16 13.62 13.53 2.87 10,35 13.61 5.77
19800.1720.21 17.9432.2113.63 4.99 5.00 11.78 11.86 7.96
19811.0420.57 7.8419.37 10.56 9.40 5.69 10.39 9.83 6.46
1982 0.35 15.77 7.03 21.8516.99 10.44 0.58 8.16 8.08 7.38
1983 0.01 7.51 7.5913.24 —5.12 —4.08 5.51




1966 26.31 18.48 2.9426.7410.3418,53 10.39 20.27 23.43 —8.34
1967 33.22 12.46 4.0529.4910.32 1927 1.23 19.06 23.07 0.10
196852.97 22.7810.0127.846.49 21,29 16.36 23.84 26.05 14.93
196941.73 20.22 5.6419.402.6716.62 14.52 24.39 19.49 15.19
197030.4326.50 8.5618.734.20 27,79 13.17 20.97 17.12 19.67
197129.43 30.3210.3131.624.5718,78 18.01 2247 22.68 12.74
197220.54 14.0612,6328.154.19550 16.47 17.15 15.39 3.40
197314.52 17.5711.0117.52575 14.38 13.50 14.75 8.91 6.50
14 28.92 21.88 22.6410.67 33.45 14.18 33.99 8.48 23.51
197513.63 8.40 5.03 28.72 3.3913,31 10.18 18.24 19.85 5.36
1976 5.83 17.19 4.16 14.51 7.17 0.69 .47 14.12 10.45 1.48
197711.72 20.16 2.76 9.95 9.06 1,27 9.85 15.51 10.21 11.24
1978111 13.03 4.25 8.5710.32 —1.69 10.18 12.63 9.32 8.48
1979 4.76 12.20 —3.08 11.04 12.24 5.66 11.57 11.66 12.32
198023.12 17.60 7.70 14.40 8.90 5.77 12.87 12.62 16.84 21.89
181 27.51 14.76 6.91 10.56 8.95 —0.32 13.44 14.79 7.34 12.09
198213.98 15.34 7.54 7.46 8.69 —6.09 14.10 15.64 7.94 13.95
1983 3.51 11.09 3.01 10.18 15.42 .12.96 8.31 10.3019
American firms.
Tables 4a and 4jpresentcorresponding corrected measures of the
total returns to debt plus equity.7 Average (l966-l) values of
these series are presented in the sixth column of tables 2a and 2j.
As before, the denominator of this measure is the sum of equity and
the book value of financial liabilities, while the numerator is the
sum of corrected earnings and corrected interest payments, equal to
interest payments less the inflation rate multiplied by the book
value of financial liabilities.. Since the addition of interest
payments offsets most of the inflation gain on nominal liabilities
included in corrected earnings, the effect of inflation corrections
on the overall return to capital is clearly negative for firms in
both countries. For the U.S., the reduction in the average value of
RIM ranges between _Q4 and 3.2. For Japan, the average reduction
is typically somewhat larger, ranging from -0.3 to 4.6.
The median average before—tax return to capital in the U.S.
falls from 10.3 percent without correction to 9.4 percent. The
median value for Japan falls substantially more, from 10.3 percent
to 7.5 percent. These larger reductions strenghten the case that
the return to capital is systematically lower in Japan.
This is evident in several industries. Consider, for example,
computers where the inflation corrections are much larger for
Japanese than for U.S. firms. Here, average rates of return for the
three Japanese companies range between and while the
range is 4.6' - for U.S. firms. In chemicals, the range is
4.0' -l0.2in Japan, compared to Dow's l0.7' for the U.S. There
remain exceptions to this rule, in the drug industry, for example.



























1966 9.7619.75 —1.158.22 9.50 12.43 19.588.7014.13
1967 10.4910.89 1.70 12.732.027.50 12.89 —0.338.1310.52
1968 10.5318.19 3.648.202.498.906.2912.12 16.928.0413.19
1969 11.42 12.36 4.28 10.75 1.70 9.165.7912.60 26.278.08
1970 9.83—2.95 —1.53 10.33 4.237.395.9413.54 15.25 6.70 3.05
1971 9.656.48 1.783.93 1.736.004.7316.14 15.11 6.5114.76
1972 9.2713.49 5.25 4.65 2.28 6.15 3.9916.64 18.44 6.3916.85
1973 10.4121.24 8.72 11.49 2.67 8.315.8524.86 29.18 8.4130.83
1974 10.99—2.32 0.71 18.487.7518.259.7827.548.7914.7311.03
1975 9.81—10.35 9.08 6.76 2.7311.275.25 40.034.9210.25 9.64
1976 9.9129.94 10.26 9.26 4.74 10.637.3626.50 21.6912.1622.26
1977 11.2516.05 12.22 14.458.2812.8713.0829.41 40.5414.5031.81
1978 12.57—17.13 17.07 21.16 7.3913.2315.8930.60 40.8117.9138.76
1979 13.16—32.62 14.57 21.946.7115.3319.1841.83 26.8919.1429.68
1980 13.75—29.64 15.18 7.18 6.19 14.6215.5726.9a —26.0417.05—4.22




























































































































































All FujiFujitsu Kao Kawaskal KOnishjroku LionMitsubishi Mitsukoshj National NEC
NipponPhoto SoapSteel Photo Chemical
Air.
Year1964
196 11.45 15.21 11.24
l9& 10.69 8.76 7.88 10.12 9.25 7.80 16.29 6.04 10.36 12.63 3.75
1967 2.30 13.02 7.48 16.09 8.90547 16.32 3.82 10.40 19.19 4.25
1968 10.98 11.37 9.1213.20 9.28 2.08 16.48 6.40 11.51 13.00 5.82
1969 8.11 12.73 5.4212.51 6.68—2.52 25.96 5.76 13.48 10.80 4.16
1970 10.94 5.33 9.08 5.46 3.13 23.28 5.39 11.35 21.08 5.42
1971 8.86 10.52 7.11 13.03 8.75 6.06 26.83 4.97 10.94 16.04 6.19
1972 5.02 10.77 6.17 9.815.69 5] 22.96 3.30 8.25 14.87 4.69
i 1QQ6 '' 6.75 11 78 .ooi.o u. u.i £.OO.ii i973
1974 3.28 10.34 2.4311.36 6.69 6.31 8.59 —2.49 8.32 22.59 0.06
1975 2.74 7.29 1.69 3.46 7.73 8.66 1.41 6.71 10.25 11.23 2.88
1976 3.69 10.09 1.72 4.08 4.46 10.92 9.33 2.83 11.56 15.37 2.43
1.89 10.86 4.53 3.66 4.5110.20 6.18 3.16 12.87 17.47 3.41 1977
1978 1.36 11.79 5.77 4.25 8.97 7.98 3.90 11.88 15.14 3.47
1979 2.38 12.42 9.22 6.25 9.56. 6.81 3.79 11.07 13.96 4.09
1.46 18.76 6.4911.98 8.50 3.07 4.23 12.38 12.55 5.89 1980
2.22 20.12 5.34 11.84 8.55 5.12 5.54 11.49 10.64 5.76 1981
1982 2.99 15.76 5.3112.0813.21 6.39 3.64 8.23 9.00 6.34
3.24 5.71 7.9510.40 2.84 —1.24 ————— 5.70 1983
NipponNissan OkiShionogi SonySumitomo Taisho Takashimaya TakedaToshiba SteelMotorElec. Chemical Chemical
1964____ ———— —_—__
1965 —— 5.109.53
19669.16 9.11 2.6313.686.728.29 8.96 9.09 14.09 —1.41
196711.37 6.78 2.7313.567.656.81 1.24 8.78 13.73 1.00
196812.0510.56 4.3313.044.927.85 14.05 10.55 16.02 5.58
19698.66 8.02 4.1812.302.256.82 13.49 10.56 14.64 6.99
19707.61 7.29 5.1514.523.35 7.35 12.38 7.49 13.08 5.42
19717.67 8.64 6.5620.794.35 5.90 16.54 9.55 13.40 3.25
1972 5.23 8.42 6.8121.413.97 3.51 15.03 8.47 10.35 1.79
19734.16 7.76 3.0413.104.762.67 11.92 6.06 4.56 —0.96
19747.37 4.50 2.6714.336.603.92 10.53 6.91 0.14 —2.19
1975 6.60 3.00 1.8120.66 3.41 3.13 9.29 7.93 12.26 0.91
1976 3.53 9.68 2.3511.50 6.68 2.24 8.95 7.49 6.20 1.30
1977 5.43 13.11 1.91 9.13 8.49 1.74 9.37 8.65 6.44 4.30
1978 2.85 9.81 3.25 8.12 8.78 0.74 9.75 8.58 6.97 4.66
1979 4.96 9.61 0.5010,62 11.05 4.45 9.36 8.95 6.66
1980 11.40 13.85 6.19!3.64 8.99 5.40 12.41 9.36 13.18 11.67
1981 11.18 12.49 6.13 10.47 8.76 2.55 12.89 11.88 6.73 9.00
1982 9.98 12.30 6.75 7.60 8.620.6 13.78 10.69 7.31 10.59
1983 6.38 9.37 4.50 10.22 14.95 10.64 7.82 8.9822
sarnple, there are clear differences in rates of return (with Japan
having a lower rate) in airlines, film and photographic equipment,
steel, autos, computers and chemicals. While we would emphasize
again that caution is necessary in regarding results fromsuch a
small sample, there seems to be some evidence that a difference in
returns to capital exists. The remainder the the paper is devoted to
considering the potential sources of this difference, and whether it
reflects a true difference in underlying capital costs.
4. Explaining Differences in the Rate of Return
In this section, we explore two types of explanations for the
apparent rate of return differential between the U.S. and Japan.
One approach is to try to explain why the costs of capital do
differ; another is to show why the rate—of—return calculations of
the previous section may need further adjustment before they can be
identified with costs of capital. Explanations of these two types
would obviously have different policy implications.
4a. Taxation
Although there are no scholarly sources that we know of to cite,
there is certainly a common perception in the U.S. that business
taxes are at the root of our problems of competition with Japan.
This argument is difficult to substantiate using our data.
Tables 5a and 5j present corrected after-tax earnings-price
ratios for U.S. and Japanese firms, respectively, calculated by









1964 4.70 8.96 3.318.97 5.133.31
1965 5.98 9.01 3.085.46 ————6.002.556.06
5.443.05 4.37
1966 7.51 12.47 —1.915.06 7.80 2.99 8.25
5.63




1968 8.5410.79 1.675.47 1.32 7.802.85 7.89
4.83
1969 10.56 17.05 3.638.65 0.90 9.392.61 17.70
5.61
1970 10.68 —3.45 —1.56 7.24 2.41 6.882.80 9.14
5.5311.07




1972 9.26 10.99 4.692.84 1.27 4.48 1.97 7.1810.92
7.70
1973 12.47 35.98 11.627.85 1.45 6.30 2.94 11.1122.94
8.68
1974 18.70 5.68 16.91 18.91 4.34 14.05 4.7122.86
17.55
197515.55 —50.54 18.668.03 1.42 8.532.4013.69
9.21 12.73 4.98
1976 9.3934.26 12.576.99 2.51 7.58 3.67
7.97 3.55




1978 15.25 —44.11 20.06 13.33 4.8013.99 7.93 11.22
9.5918.00
1979 19.44 —138.25 15.53 15.66 3.66 15.5510.48
12.1322.91
1980 21.43 —139.58 12.945.34 3.65 16.58 8.4915.68
34.84 13.0517.50




















































































































































1965 9.07 14.80 4.74
196642.31 6.71 7.646.9714.377.20 15.79 14.42 6.74 7.35 2.91
19679.21 9.86 7.54 13.7314.877.88 15.42 5.92 6.20 12.51 4.26
196832.37 9.7410.02 13.0921.80—0.57 18.93 16.21 6.59 8.947.7
196914.70 11.18 4.49 11.6913.39 —14,99 30.85 17.02 8.62 6.38 3.47
1970 16.89 10.34 4.65 7.6218.91 6.66 27.66 p.49 8.62 13.50 7.09
1971 15.95 10.52 5.51 15.2122.96 12.84 23,77 19.57 8,24 9.62 7,80
1972 8.52 8.67 4.258.66 18.36 7.19 16,91 14.24 6.38 8.59 6,22
1973 12.02 11.10 4.69 12.43 18.55 8.84 23,63 12.50 5,34 12.60 7,64
1974 15.21 19.97 10.57 38.7155.6926.30 34,95 29.11 9,55 13.5417.62
1975 6.77 4.50 2.037.9514.63 19.16 —0,59 37.75 5.59 5.90 6,33
1976 6.27 4.80 0.71 3.39 9.9 7.87 8,37 10.28 5,25 6.94 4.16
1977 0.23 6.54 4.29 1.34 9.97 7.27 6,60 1.85 5,73 8.29 5.08
1978 —0.07 7.21 4.92 7.24 7.20 4,37 6.78 5,29 7.95 4.52
1979 1.16 6.89 8.57 0.84 7.22 7,94 2.62 5,09 3,94
1980 0.01 9.32 10.1716.14 6.02 238 2.70 6.09 6.71 492
1981 —0.60 9.71 ————2.0711.04 4.61 4.47 2.71 5.41 4.85 4.02
1982 0.34 7.69 1.3113.54 8.49 4.89 0.45 3.95 4,42 4,05
1983 —0.06 2.41 6.39 7.20 ———— —4.74 —4.01 3.17
NipponNissan OkiShionogi Sony StitQno Taisho Takashimaya Takeda Toshiba
StulMotorElec. Cheaical Chemical
1964.._..__ ——-— ._.— —--
1965__——— — — 1.3411.33 —— ————
196621.2113.37 0.34 16.434.95 15.896.80 15.S 13.86 —8,34
196725.28 7.61 1.34 18.626.1116.200.41 14.15 13.26 —2..9
196844.1316.06 6.03 17.284.2919.239.38 16.79 13.18 9.92
196933.6714.71 3.29 11.281.6213.178.64 16.87 9.87 9,94
197025.8718.19 6.01 10.542.6224.567,53 16.26 9.3414,11
197125.1820.02 7.07 17.862.1116.8010.02 15.00 12.67 10.31
197218.64 8.50 8,91 16.432.03 5.008.87 11.47 9.40 1.63
197313.5411.37 7.218.903.2312.276.20 0.91 3.02 4.73
197436.0522.42 17.689.164.5830.80 4.57 27.02 0.15 19.17
1975 10.10 5.48 3.48 13.281.1313.31 4.09 13.24 9.36 3.48
1976 5.83 7.79 2.40 3.95 3.16 1.24 3.97 10.46 2.21 —0.35
1977 8.65 10.93 2.17 3.05 4.91 1.27 4.72 9.66 2.34 6,37
1978 0.56 7.35 2.91 2.81 5.58 —1.69 5.00 7.43 .36 6.16
1979—1.38 6.76 —3.484.656.74 1.95 4.72 5.81 4.11 6.62
198011.87 8.98 3.916.05 4.35 4.07 6.40 5.30 6.68 .12.65
1981 7.49 8.67 4.37 4.31 4.92 —0.32 6.68 7.52 3.27 7.00
1982 7.48 8.59 6.152.47 5.01 —6.09 6.85 6.34 3.45 8.08
1983 2.73 6.85 1.082.96 7.55 4.46 -3.76 6.2625
used to produce Tables 3a and3j. In similar fashion,we produce
after—tax returns to capital, presented in Tables 6a and 6j, by
adding to after—tax corrected earnings corrected Interest payments
less the imputed tax deduction for such payments defined to equal to
nominal interest payments multiplied by the relevant corporate tax
rate. These correpsond to the financial concept of earnings before
interest, after taxes. One may think of them as the after-tax
returns the firma would earn if they were unlevered. Averages for
these two measures for the period 1966—81 are provided in columns 5
and 7 of Tables 2a and 2j.
By comparing before—tax and after—tax returns to capital, one
can assess the impact of the corporate tax system, holding financial
policy constant. Both returns are those the firm would earn if
unlevered, end the difference thus represents the tax burden on the
firm's real, rather than financial activity.
Even a cursory comparison of before-tax and after-tax rates of
return shows that it is Japanese, not American firms that are taxed
more heavily on their real income. All but five of the 21 Japanese
firms have average after—tax rates of return to capital that are
less than half of their before-tax rates of return. This Is true
for only 10 of the 19 American firma. Moreover, because of the
substantial tax reduction introduced by the 1981 tax act, the trend
beyond the 1966—81 period over which these averages were taken
should be toward even more favorable comparative tax treatment in
the U.S.8
There are well—known pitfalls involved in using average rates
of return to infer marginal effective rates relevant to the cost of
capital for new investment. It would be preferable to use such26
Table 6a






































































































































































































































After-Tax Return to Capital-Japan
(Corrected)
All FujiFujitsu Kao awaskai Konishjroku LionMitsubishi Mitsukoshi National NEC NipponPhoto SoapSteelPhoto Chemical Air.
Year
1964 ———— ————
1965——— 6.95 8.20 555
19669.42 4.56 3.964.765.723.91 7.69 3.88 6.13 6.14 1.76 1967 0.85 6.73 3.329.415.552.34 8.17 1.01 6.03 10.68 1.77 19689.37 6.83 5.49 7.63 5.96 0.13 8.59 3.66 6.61 8.09 2.88 19696.21 8.18 3.307.043.88—4.50 14.63 3.31 8.33 6.08 2.04 19707.12 6.81 2.782.992.711.77 11.55 3.08 6.97 11.55 2.95 19716.16 6.50 3.477.684.923.74 14.37 2.32 6.39 8.92 3.25 19723.87 6.16 2.794.74 2.86 2.55 11.85 1.05 4.90 8.43 2.42
19734.27 5.49 0.376.220.780.69 7.51 —1.57 3.60 11.53 —0.24 19741.56 4.26 —0.056.032.700.30 0.65 —4.83 4.68 11.60 —3.06
19751.40 2.83 —0.160.103.41 .. -- .UQ —i.14 j.LU 4.11 6.61 0.22
19761.78 3.98 —0.300.011.744.34 2.47 0.23 5.42 7.30 0.10
1977—0.26 5.15 1.570.091.36 4.71. 0.79 —0.27 6.23 8.86 0.82
1978 —0.055.74 ——— 1.971.244.54 1.94 1.25 5.76 8.58 1.22
19790.94 6.19 ————— 4.391.814.74 3.40 1.59 5.52 7.52 1.99
19800.44 8.80 2.965.603.40 1.05 1.63 6.44 7.08 3.03
19810.10 9.57 L256.033.56 1.91 2.26 6.03 5.32 3.03
1982146774 1.616.716.46 2.73 1.68 3.99 4.93 3.22
19831.72 2.014.965.62 0.89 —2.10 ————— 3.20
Nippon Nissan OkiShionogi SonySumitono Taisho Tak.aahimaya TakedaToshiba SteelMotorElse. Chemical Chsmical
1964— —— —— ———— —
1965——— ————— 2.25 6.94
1966 5.56 5.52 0.0007.482.59 5.48 5.63 5.58 7.61 —3.11 1967 6.87 3.19 0.02 7.42 4.02 4.13 0.20 5.14 7.09 —1.43 1968 8.17 6.39 1.38 7.08 2.84 5.36 7.80 6.20 2.48
1969 5.19 4.71 1.73 6.49 1.19 3,94 7.90 6.14 7.00 3.54 1970 4.28 3.16 2.57 7.48 1.67 4.46 6.94 4.23 6.53 2.22 1971 4.56 4.20 3.62 11.08 1.82 3.36 9.05 5.08 7.98 1.07
1972 2.66 4.21 3.6512.021.81 1.86 7.93 4,52 5.68 —0.42
1973 1.94 3.21 —0.18 5.63 2.25 0.16 5.04 2.84 —0.20 —3.02 1974 2.83 0.37 —0.68 3.32 0.97 1.06 1.88 2.51 —5.92 —5.01
1975 2.60 0.04 —0.62 8.07 0.95 0.82 3.46 3.90 4.57 —1.61
19761.21 3.29 —0.032.852.73 —0.26 3.61 3.97 0.29 —1.35 19771.94 6.27 —0.032.684.38 —0.48 4.38 4.14 0.66 0.84 19780.31 5.02 0.892.614.42 —0.95 4.70 4.24 0.64 1.96 19790.93 5.06 —1.044.485.95 1.45 4.61 4.25 3.35 3.02
1980 5.44 6.86 2.83 5.764.39 2.78 6.14 3.81 5.06 6.15 1981 4.74 7.02 3.214.314.71 0.75'6.36 5.79 2.90 4.70 19825.08 6.70 4.342.614.86 —0.84 6.68 447 3.14 5.81
1983 3.78 5.63 2.123,J.7 7.32 443 3.57 5.1028
measures9 in the current discussion, but they are not, as yet,
available for Japan.
There is a second channel through which corporate taxescould
affect the cost of capital. The previous calculationsof before-tax
and after-tax returns to capital are based on costs tothe unlevered
firm: earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and earningsbefore
interest, after—taxes. To the extent that there are nodifferences
in the after-tax costs of debt and equity finance, these arethe
appropriate statistics to use. If such differencesdo exist because
of the corporate deductibility of interest payments, the extentto
which this tax advantage is available in the two countries would
also affect the coat of capital.
An extreme upper bound on the size of this advantage is the
firm's annual tax deduction for interest payments. For example,if
firm had a fifty percent debt-value ratio, a nominal interest rate
of 8 percent and a tax rate of this would represent a maximum
gain of 1.6 percentage points in its cost of capital.Even this
would require that there be no offsetting costs to leverage, such as
increased taxation at the individual level. Since equity income is
taxed less heavily than interest income In both countries (capital
gains are not taxed at all in Japan) ,onewould not expect this to
be the case, even if a full tax offset (as hypothesized by Miller
1977) Ia absent.
We have calculated these upper bounds for each company in each
year. Averages for each company for the period1966—1981 are given
in Table 7a for the U.S. and 7j for Japan. The U.S. averages range
from O.O7 for Kodak to 2.55' for Macy's with a median value of
O.7O (Exxon). For Japan the maximum, minimum and median are 2.3429
Table 7a













































for Nippon Steel, O.l6 forTaisho, arid l.24'(Nissan Motors),
respectively.
These measures indicate only avery smell difference in the
maximum potential gains from leverage in Japan andthe U.S. Given
that these upper bounds may greatly overstate thegains from
leverage in both countries, we would argue thatgreater Japanese
ability to finance with tax—deductible debt is ofnegligible
importance in explaining before-tax cost ofcapital difference
between the two countries.
We conclude provisionally that corporate taxescannot explain
why Japanese firms would enjoy a lower cost of capital thenthose in
the U.S.
4b. Differences in National Savings Rates
It appears from calculations of after—tax rates ofreturn that
Japanese corporations earn substantially less for the holdersof
their securities than do U.S. corporations. Some havebeen tempted
to ascribe this result to the higher personalsavings rate in Japan.
There are two problems with this conclusion. First,savings rates
do not necessarily translate into rates ofcapital accumulation in a
world of open capital markets, since capital would flowabroad to
gain higher rates of return.
There is some controversy about theopenness of the Japanese
capital market. However, there is a second factor that must be
considered. The Japanese economy, including, ofcourse, its capital
stock, has been growing much more rapidly then that of the U.S.over
the past two decades. A greater rate of investment out ofGNP has32
been required for Japan simply to maintain any given capital-output
ratio. A comparison suggests that the capital-output ratios for
productive sectors in Japan are no higher than comparable figures
for the U.S.1°
4c. Differences in Growth and Risk
One is accustomed to seeing some firms in the U.S. have higher
price—earnings "multiples" than others. Systematic differences of
this sort can be due to one of two factors. One is differences in
risk. Riskier firms have higher rates of return to capital, on
average, because investors are risk averse. It is a matter of
semantics whether the riskier firm has a higher cost of capital,
since it must earn the same risk-adiusted rate of return as the less
risky firm. A second reason for variation in earnings—price ratios
is related to growth; not simply growth itself, but the unusual
investment opportunities that one normally associates with rapidly
growing enterprises. Firms with access to projects with high
marginal products would be expected to grow more quickly, and the
excess returns on these future projects should be capitalized into
the current stock price.11
This would certainly not represent a cost of capital
difference, only a difference in the composition of economic
earnings: a greater fraction would be accounted for by capital
gains, (in excess of retained earnings) which are not included in
our calculations thus far.
If Japanese firms are less risky than U.S. firms, or possess
greeter "exceptional growth opportunities," these could help explain33
why the observed before-tax return to capitalappears to be somewhat
lower in Japan. To assess these possibilities,one must use data on
total market returns to investors instead of thereported earnings
of firms. For the U.S., this calculation isstraightforward. To
compute the annual return to equity, we add common and preferred
dividends to the change in the value of the firm (net ofnew share
issues), and divide this by the beginning of year value of the firm.
This yields a measure of the rate at which the firm'sequity is
capitalized.12
Deriving similar statistics for Japan presents some
difficulties involving the growth in equity. In Japan, there have
been many more new issues of equity shares than in theU.S., and to
complicate matters, some are given at no cost to current share
holders (stock dividends), some are sold in the market at themarket
price, while still others are sold to existing stock holders at its
face value (more frequently 5O per share, a fraction of themarket
price). Fortunately, we have been able to obtain, for each of the
companies in our sample, the complete history of new issues
including the price at which they were issued. We therefore define
the rate of capital gain on shares as the increase in the market
value of outstanding shares less capital paid in the form ofnew
share purchases, divided by the market value of shares outstandir-iq
at the beginning of the period. The market rate of return onequity
then is defined as the sum of the rate of capital gainso defined
plus the dividends paid divided by the market value of shares
outstanding at the beginning of the period.
The results of our calculations are presented in Table 8a and
8j.Inthese tables, we first list earnings-price ratio after tax,34
Table 8a
Earnings Price Ratio After Tax and Market Return on Equity
(1971 —1981)
E/P -AfterTax Market Ret/Equity
Company Unadj Adj
AT&T 11.6 14.7 2.9
Chrysler -32.3 -25.0 0.9
CDC 10.2 12.8 4,2
Delta Air 10.4 9.5 2.2
Digital 4.6 2.9 16.8
Dow 9.4 10.8 7.6
Kodak 6.7 5.5 2.1
Exxon 14.4 13.7 6.5
Ford 5.3 6.0 -4.5
GE 8.7 9.4 4.2
GM 11.2 10.0 -1.5
IBM 6.3 4.9 -2.3
?lacy 12.6 15.5 12.8
Merck 5.0 4.2 2.2
Nat'l.Semi. 6.3 5.1 43.6
Pfizer 6.6 6.3 1.8
P 6. G 6.2 5.8 0.7
Sears 8.4 7.2 -6.6
USSteel 14.6 13.9 5.835
Table 8j
Earnings-Price Ratio After Tax and Market Returnon Equity
(1971 —1981)




Fuji 10.3 9.0 9.2
Fujitsu 4.5 4.6 2.7 Kao 7.3 10.3 15.1
Kawasakj 8.516.9 16.5 Koniahiroku 9.3 10.4 24.3
Lion 13.6 12.1 19.7
MitsubIshi 6.0 12.7 16.9 MItaukohj 5.9
National 8.4 8.4 12.2 NEC 4.7 6.6 7.3
Nippon Air 2.3 6.0 16.9
Nippon Steel 7.4 12.4 20.2 Nissan 10.4 10.8 22.9 Oki 4.4 5.2 5.2
Shionogi 12.3 8.1 11.8
Sony 5.0 3.9 19.6 Sumitomo 4.3 7,7 18.5 Taishc 8.8 5.9 8.2
Takashimays 7.1 11.3 9.1 Takeda 9.3 5.0 12.6 Toshiba 6.9 7.1 13.636
both unadjusted for inflation and adjusted for inflation, averaged
over the period of 1971 to 1981, in columns 2and 3. Column 3 would
have been the same as column 5 of Tables 2a and 2j, exceptthat in
Table 8 it is averaged over shorter period of 1971
-1981rather
than over 1966-81, because some detailed information on newissues
records was missing on the Compustat tape before 1971.
Results are quite dramatic. On en inflation adjusted basis,the
median earnings price ratio for the U.S. is 7.2 (Sears)while it is
8.1 (Shionogi) for Japan. Looking at the third columnsof Tables Be
and Bj, we may conclude that there is little to distinguishbetween
the distribution of the earnings price ratio for the U.S.(excluding
Chrysler, which is a special case) from that for Japan.In terms of
the market rate of return shown in the fourth column, however,the
difference is enormous. The median for the U.S. is 2.2' (Delta
13
Airlines and Merck), while itis13.6" (Toshiba) for Japan.
There may be any number of reasons not to take these figures
too seriously. Among them, we may note that during the period
covered, the capitalization rate in general in the U.S. mayhave
risen significantly, and figures for the U.S. may include a large
one time capital loss which may be distorting ourresults. Japan
may still have been on the post-war decliningtrend of the general
capitalization rate during this period, which appears to haveended
in the early 1960s for the U.S.
We do not wish to assert here, on the basis of information
presented in Tables Ba and Bj, that the required rate of return on
equity has been this much higher in Japan than in the U.S. Onthe
other hand, even a much smaller revision in this direction of the
after-tax costs of equity reported earlier would be sufficient to37
nullify any apparent difference in overall returns tocapital in the
two countries. Given all the evidence presented inthis paper,
therefore there do not seem to beany grounds to conclude that the
cost of capital in Japan was significantly lower than inthe U.S.
for the period covered.
5. Conclusions
We have not as yet reached any firm conclusions aboutwhether
the Japanese cost of capital is lower than that in the U.S..but we
have made some progress. There appears some evidence of lower
before-tax rates of return in Japan, though given oursample size
and selection method, this result is by no means defInitIve.
In searching for potential explanations, we have been ableto
rule out one that is among the moat frequently cited, business
taxation. Japanese real investments appear to bemore, rather than
less, heavily taxed than those undertaken in the U.S., and the
maximum potential gain from the greater use of leverage isvery
small. It also appears that the understatement of capitalgains by
book value data issufficientto explain any apparent gap in returns
between the two countries.
We have based our analysis on samples of firms from the U.S.
and from Japan, but we have chosen these firmsvery informally on
the basis of their size, industry to which they helonq,
comparability, and availability of date. It would be quite useful
to work with a somewhat larc*er and more syatematiosily chosen
sample.It would also be very useful to estimate ex-ante cost of
capital measures, rather than workinq with purely ex-post38
realization data. Finally, we hope to make parallel computations
using data for industries and the whole economy, in order to
supplement the results based on individual firm data reportedhere.
Ultimately, one wishes to understand variations in the rate of
return in the context of the savings arid investment patterns of the
countries involved, and how two or more countries may dust to each




See, especially, Hatsopoulos (1983).
2
"Accrued employees' Severace Indemnities" isa special reserve
account in Japanese corporations setup to meet a requirement of the
taxlaw.To begin with, it must be understood thatmoat employees
of Japanese corporations are not givenretirement annuities, but a
large cash payment at the time of retirement, 3 to 4 timesthe
annual salary for the last year of employment. Thecorporate tax
law of Japan says that (1) corporations mustestimate the amount of
the total severance payments that must beundertaken if the company
is to cease operations immediately andpay every employee the
severance pay which he or she is entitled to; (2) "Accrued
Employees' Severance Indemnities" should be 4O of theamount
calculated under Cl); (3) the retirement benefitsactually paid
during the fiscal year should be charged against thisaccount; and
(4) the difference between the amount definedunder (2) and the
remaining balance at the end of the fiscal year can becharged as
current expenses, and it is deductible forcorporate income tax
purposes. In other words, this liability item is a bookentry, a
device to maintain the account for the retirementbenefits on an
accrual basis, and it is not an actualliability against which
interest is paid. Indeed, there is no interestpayment on this item
in the income stetment of acompany. The entire contribution into
this reserve account is treated as labor coatin the income
atatment. Thus, it is not appropriate to include thisitem in
liabilities of corporations in Japan.
To bring the accounting with respect to thisitem to a cash
basis as in the case for U.S. corporations,we have subtracted the40
net change in this account from the current costs of Japanese
companies.
See, for example, Shoven and Bulow (1975,6), for an evaluation of
the effects on American corporations.
This procedure was also used by Auerbach (1984), where it is
described and evaluated more fully.
We are grateful to Bronwyn Hall for calling this problem to our
attention.
6In principle, one could get a rough estimate by redoing the
estimates for Japan with land included.
The use of such corrected estimates of the return to corporate
capital to infer the required return are familiar in the literature.
See, for example, Feldstein and Summers (1977) or Feldstein et.al.
(1983).
8For a discussion, see Auerbech (1983a).
As found in Auerbech (1983a) or the international comparison
volume edited by King and Fullerton (1984).
10For the U.S., for l979. gross national produce originating in the
non—financial corporate sector divided by the stock of reproducible
tangible assets excluding inventories at the replacement cost is
approximately 1.10 (Survey of Current Business, July 1983, P. 30,
and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Balance Sheets
of the United States, 1945-1982, p. 44).. For Japan, one needs to
make some approximations in terms of the sectors included to come as
close as possible to the one ued for the U.S. We have taken fixed
reproduciple assets other than inventories for non—financial
incorporated enterprises (p. 309, Annual Report of National
Accounts, 1985) less estimated residential structures owned by this41
sector as the capital stock, while we have used GNPoriginating in
the private producer sector less agriculture, financeand insurance,
real estate, and service industries as output. Thecorresponding
figure for Japan is 1.14.
This can be rigorously shown using, for instance, the"q" theory
of investment. Suppose there is the anticipation thatan outward
shift will occur in the production frontier in thefuture,
increasing the marginal product of capital. This will increase
investment, and market value, immediately, decreasing measured
earnings in the short run because of capital deepening. Hence,one
would observe a low earnings-price ratio in the shortrun. The
capitalized value of higher future marginal products rises as their
date of appearance nears, giving investors a sufficientoverall
return to equity.
12
the marginal source of equity funds is retainedearnings,
rather than new shares, then one should adjust dividends inthis
calculation, multiplying them by a factor less than 1 that
represents the relative cost to the firm of delivering an after—tax
dollar to the investor in the form of capital gainsas opposed to
dividends. This is the ratio (l-B)/'1-c, where B is the dividend
tax rate and c is the accrual—equivalent of thecapital gains tax.
See Auerbsch (1979, l983b). This correction isimportant in the
current context to the extent that dividend yields differ between
the U.S. and Japan.
13
This set of results is broadly consistent with thosereported by
Baldwin [1985), who found Japanese market returns toequity to be
higher in the aggregate than those in the U.S. (but also riskier).42
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